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A CHILD'S VIEW OF RECOVERY UNDER THE
NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE ACT OR 'HE
WHO HESITATES IS LOST'
Leonard D. Pertnoy"
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of statute of limitations, which acts as a bar to
certain claims that are not timely filed,' was developed to satisfy
the public policy of preventing injustice and perpetual litiga-
tion,2 but often has inequitable results. These inequities are
especially so in cases where a limitation on recovery has been
placed upon children who might otherwise qualify for compensa-
tion under the National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986 (Vaccine
Act).3 This Article examines the application of the doctrine of
Equitable Tolling to the Rights of Impaired Children to recover
under the National Childhood Vaccine Act and traces the tre-
mendous effects they can have on one child's life.
In understanding the context of the issues relative to the
harsh application of the doctrine of the statute of limitations
under the Vaccine Act, this Article will first look at the historical
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, A-B. 1964, Univer-
sity of Vienna; B.A. 1966, University of Louisville; J.D. 1969, University of Miami
School of Law. I would like to extend special thanks to my research assistants, Aar-
on M. Cohen and Michael B. Senape, for all of their excellent work in preparing this
article.
1. Statutes of limitations are statutes which set maximum time periods for
which certain actions can be brought. After the time period elapses, which is set out
in the statute or "as run," no legal action can be brought even though the cause of
action may have occurred. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990).
2. "The doctrine of the law is that the dominion of things must not long re-
main uncertain, so as to disturb the peace of society by giving rise to numerous and
perpetual litigation; and that, to prevent such serious evil, the laches of those who
are dilatory in pursuing their just remedies, should be punished, and that those who
are indolent shall impute to themselves the punishment." HENRY F. BUSHWELL, THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION 7-8 (1991).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (1993). The National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Compensation Act consists of two parts. Part A is the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which establishes "a Federal 'no fault' com-
pensation program under which awards can be made to vaccine-injured persons
quickly, easily, and with certainty and generosity." H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3
(1986); see 42 U.S.C. 300aa-10 to-34 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993); Lisa J. Steel, National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is this the Best We Can Do for Our
Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 144 (1994). Part B is the National Vaccine Pro-
gram, which is concerned with perfecting vaccines, monitoring adverse reactions to
vaccines, and supporting other efforts by the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices to improve the nation's immunization programs. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -6
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); see H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3-4, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344-45.
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background of the Vaccine Act and its intended purpose. Next,
the Article will examine one child's medical history and adverse
experiences with the Vaccine Act. The Article will then explain
the general and case-specific procedures of the Vaccine Act and
its causation element. Finally, the Article will examine the dif-
ferences between the doctrines of equitable estoppel and statute
of limitations and provide an explanation of why the former
should be applied in certain case brought under the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986
In order to put this problem into perspective it is imperative
to understand the background of the Vaccine Act. The Vaccine
Act, which has a three-year statute of limitations,4 was enacted
to provide an alternative method of compensation for vaccine-
related injuries5 and to secure a constant supply of vaccines to
help bolster federal immunization initiatives.' The House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce created this alternative com-
pensation system to supplement traditional civil tort law and
settlement arrangements for injuries resulting from diphtheria,'
4. See 42 U.S.C 300aa-16(a)(2).
5. "The consumption of vaccines is not a choice, but a requirement. All fifty
states and the District of Columbia require virtually all children to be vaccinated for
seven of the previously common childhood diseases--polio, measles, mumps, rubella,
diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis--before they are permitted to attend school." H. R.
REP. No. 99-908, at 5; see also Randall B. Keiser, Deja Vu All Over Again? The
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986, 47 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 15, 15 (1992). "All 50 states allow exemptions from vaccinations for medical
reasons and all but West Virginia allow exemptions for religious reasons." Id. "Par-
ents and children are not permitted to decide for themselves whether immunization
is in their best interests. The state and federal governments have decided that im-
munization is necessary in the nation's war against disease. The federal government
supports the mass immunization programs by testing and monitoring the vaccines
and by informing the public of the benefits and dangers of the vaccines." Steel, supra
note 3, at 144-45 (citing HARRIS L. COULTER & BARBARA L. FISHER, A SHOT IN THE
DARc WHY THE P IN THE DPT VACCINATIONS MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR CHILD'S
HEALTH 199, 201-02 (1991)); see Okianer C. Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DPT Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799,
808-10 (1988).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 3-5; see also Patten v. Lederle Lab., 655 F.
Supp. 745, 749 (D. Utah 1987); Peggy J. Naile, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine Injury
and the Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND. L. REV. 655, at 657 (1989).
7. Diphtheria is "an acute infectious disease caused by toxigenic strains of Co-
rynebacterium diphtheria, acquired by contact with an infected person or a carrier of
the disease, which is usually confined to the upper respiratory tract, and character-
ized by the formation of a tough membrane . . . attached firmly to the underlying
tissue that will bleed if forcibly removed." DORLANDS ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIO-
2
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tetanus,8 and pertussis 9 inoculations (DPT).' ° Congress was
concerned that injured children were not being properly compen-
sated due to inadequacies in the tort system."
However, the difficulty and expense in handling this type of
litigation causes problems to arise when children that would
otherwise be entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Act are
unaware of their rights to compensation. This is due to the fact
that medical research, until recently, did not support a causal
connection between encephalopathy and the DPT inoculations
given to children. Because of this lack of causation, injured par-
ties had no other option than to file tort claims against the indi-
vidual manufacturers.
Moreover, a strict reading of the statute of limitations provi-
sion of the Vaccine Act' 2 prevents a petition from being filed "if
the first symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant
aggravation of such injury occurred more than thirty-six months
after the date of the administration of the vaccine. " 3 According-
ly, a healthy baby who is vaccinated and subsequently becomes
ill may be barred from recovery if no medical data is uncovered
within the three-year period to indicate a causal relationship.
Equitable tolling is often applied to a statute of limitations
to suspend the application of the rule and provide a more equita-
ble result. By suspending the application of a statute of limita-
tions, a plaintiff who, despite all due diligence, is unable to ob-
tain vital information bearing on the existence of a claim is safe-
guarded. Particularly, a plaintiff who does not show any symp-
toms of injury from a DPT inoculation until thirty-six months
after the inoculation may still have a claim under the Vaccine
Act. The application of equitable tolling is the only method avail-
NARY 473 (28th ed. 1994).
8. Tetanus is "an acute, often fatal infectious disease caused by the anaerobic,
spore forming bacillus Clostridium tetani; the agent most often enters the body
through contaminated puncture wounds ... physiological tetanus; a state of sus-
tained muscular contraction without periods of relaxation caused by repetitive stimu-
lation of the motor nerve trunk at frequencies so high that the individual muscle
twitches are fused and cannot be distinguished from one another." Id. at 1691.
9. Pertussis is "an acute, highly contagious infection of the respiratory tract
most frequently affecting young children, usually caused by Bordetella pertussis." Id.
at 1268.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 3-5; see also Patten, 655 F. Supp. at 749;
Naile, supra note 6, at 657.
11. See Marlene K. Tandy, Federal Circuit Review of Vaccine Compensation
Cases Under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act: 1990-1995, 5 FED. CiR. B.J.
29 (1995).
12. See 42 U.S.C. 300aa-16(a)(2).
13. Id.
1998] 277
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able for plaintiffs in such situations to correct injustices that
would otherwise result from a strict interpretation of the Vaccine
Act and ensure they are not denied compensation for DPT relat-
ed, permanent, life-altering disabilities.
The case of Alex Chariff is a perfect example of the injustic-
es described above. This Article will be a guide through the life
and troubled times of Alex showing how strict application of the
doctrine of statute of limitations has limited Alex's recovery and
resulted in a denial of compensation for Alex's DPT related dis-
abilities.
B. Facts of Alex's Case
On April 28, 1986, at 9:36 a.m., Alexander "Alex" Chariff
was born at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami." Alex's
mother carried him to full term and he was a healthy new-
born. 5 Upon his first examination doctors failed to notice any
apparent abnormalities, or birth related injuries. Alex, a normal
baby, was expected to grow up as any other healthy child would.
He was required by law to receive four DPT vaccinations. On
August 28, 1989, Alex received his fourth and final DPT vaccina-
tion from his pediatrician. 8
Within three days of Alex's final DPT shot, he began to ex-
perience a very high fever and his parents noticed changes in his
daily activities. Alex started to sway from his normal everyday
actions and his behavioral changes were unusual for a boy of his
age. Alex's parents behaved as responsible parents and took him
to the doctor for treatment.
Unfortunately, Alex's condition continued to worsen and he
suffered from almost constant cold-like symptoms and high tem-
perature. 7 Soon thereafter, Alex began to experience episodes
in which he would just sit and stare motionless into space. 8
The staring episodes were the beginning of what doctors later
diagnosed as seizures. 9 As a result of these seizure episodes,
Alex encountered "drop attacks" where his eyes moved in circles
and began to raise, eventually causing him to fall to the
14. See medical records on file with author.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
4
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ground.2" Additionally, Alex began drooling from the mouth and
showed signs of oral discomfort, including extreme reddening
and soreness of the throat.21 Doctors also noted that Alex was
experiencing a decrease in muscle tone.22 This formerly healthy
baby boy started to experience signs of paralysis' and unre-
sponsiveness to external stimuli, such as people passing by or
talking to him.24
Alex's motor skills weakened significantly during the period
following his last inoculation and he developed facial ticks.'
The seizures progressed down to his lower body and he was
eventually unable to control his lower body movements or func-
tions.26 Alex became extremely hyperactive, unable to sit or stay
motionless. Often he would lose momentary consciousness and
pass out.27 Alex's actions also included bizarre periods of time in
which he would howl at the moon.' It was during this period of
time that Alex shifted from left-handedness to right-handed-
ness.' Less than two months after the final inoculation, Alex
began experiencing violent tremor-type seizures.30
As a result of Alex's behavior and physical condition, he
underwent numerous neurological examinations and tests at
various hospitals throughout the United States.3' Alex's par-
ents, in an attempt to diagnose their child's condition and deter-
mine what was causing this unusual change in their baby boy,
took him to specialists throughout the country.32 These doctors
tried to determine the cause of Alex's changed conditions and
provide him with adequate and appropriate treatment. In early
1991, Alex was hospitalized and a Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(MRI) scan of Alex's brain revealed "inflamed meningitis," which
indicated to the doctors that Alex had some inflammation of the
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Paralysis is the "loss or impairment of motor function in a part due to
lesion on the neural or muscular mechanism also there can be an "impairment of
sensory functions." DORLANDS ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1227 (28th ed.
1994).
24. See medical records on file with author.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
279
5
Pertnoy: A Child's View of Recovery Under the National Childhood Vaccine Act or "He Who Hesitates is Lost"
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1998
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
membranes of his brain."3 This swelling was potentially respon-
sible for some of the problems with Alex's motor skills and be-
havior patterns, but there was insufficient data to draw any sort
of conclusion.' Subsequently, Alex was taken to Columbia Pres-
byterian Hospital where he was placed on steroids 5 and Pheno-
barbital.3 " This treatment helped relieve some of his discomfort
and initially reduced the number and severity of the seizures. 7
Soon after, however, the seizures began again and Alex
started to experience severe, violent seizures in addition to the
drop attacks and staring spells." In response, doctors at the
University of California ordered a Position Emission Tomography
(PET).39 This procedure showed an area of abnormal brain tis-
sue in his right temporal lobe.' In order to alleviate this, Alex
had a right temporal lobe resection.41 Unfortunately, neither
this surgery, nor the post-operative medicines that the doctors
proscribed, helped alleviate Alex's condition or control his sei-
zures.42 Alex's condition continued to worsen and in September
of 1992 Alex's mother took him to Johns Hopkins and Boston
Children's Hospital for expert consultations.' The doctors rec-
ommended a hemispherectomy and Alex's father, contacted an
old friend, Dr. Aizik Wolf at the University of Maryland, for
another opinion. " Dr. Wolf concurred with the diagnosis and a
right frontal lobe resection was performed at the University of
Maryland Hospital.' The operation apparently caused the drop
attacks, from which Alex previously suffered, to cease."
However, the staring spells, which Alex had suffered since
three days after the last injection, persisted.47 Between Decem-
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Steroids are used "mainly to promote growth and repair body tissues in
senility, debilitating illness, and convalescence." DoRLANDs ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1579 (28th ed. 1994).
36. Phenobarbital is "a long-acting barbiturate, used as sedative, hypnotic and
anticonvulsant, administrated orally." DoRLANDs ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1274-76 (28th ed. 1994).
37. See medical records on file with author.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
280 [Vol. 59
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ber, 1992 and November 1992, Alex underwent three more sur-
geries at the University of Maryland, all resulted in very little
improvement." Since the right frontal lobe resection was per-
formed, Alex developed e. coli Meningitis and received intrathe-
cal medication.49 Alex's seizures persisted and it was in Septem-
ber, 1993 that Alex had a total right hemispherectomy (function-
al) performed at Miami Children's Hospital, whereby the right
part of Alex's brain was removed. ° Despite all the surgeries,
consultations and treatments, Alex continues to have staring
episodes, where the left side of his face pulls upward. These do
not appear to be associated with any apparent alteration in his
level of consciousness, as Alex has no control over this strange
occurrence.51 Furthermore, there is no family history of epilep-
sy, febrile seizures, degenerative illness, retardation, or motor
tics.52 Initially, none of the doctors that examined Alex ever de-
duced or even contemplated that this condition was a result of
the last DPT shot that Alex received on August 28, 1989."3
Throughout Alex's care and treatment there were conflicting
medical opinions as to the nature and cause of his condition. In
some instances, the diagnosis used for treatment was
Rasmussen's Syndrome,' but the doctors at Duke University
Hospital said that a Rasmussen's Syndrome diagnosis was incon-
clusive.55 In fact, up until March 2, 1994, no one suggested a
connection between DPT and Alex's condition.
The first indication that Alex's condition might be related to
DPT came in March of 1994 when his parents happened to see a
television report on the newly discovered connections between
DPT and conditions such as Alex's.56 Prior to 1994, there was
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. "Possible causes [of epilepsy partialis continuans] include infarction, hemor-
rhage, tumor, and inflammation. Epilepsy partialis continuans is the initial feature of
a poorly defined entity of childhood called Rasmussen encephalitis .... Affected
children have focal motor seizures that defy treatment and progress to affect first
both limbs on one side of the body and then the limbs on the other side. Progressive
hemiplegia and other neurologic deficits develop, and often they remain even after
seizures have stopped." GERALD M. FENICHEL, CLINICAL PEDIATRIC NEUROLOGY, A
SIGNS AND SYMPTOMs APPROACH 32 (2d ed. 1993).
55. See medical records on file with author.
56. The 60 Minutes television report on March 2, 1994, followed the publication
of the 1994 Institute of Medicine report, DPT and Chronic Nervous System Dysfunc-
tion, A New Analysis. See infra note 89.
1998]
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no medically accepted causal connection between DPT inocula-
tions and encephalopathy.57 The medical research community
reconsidered its previous view and now supports the position
that a DPT inoculation can be the triggering factor of chronic en-
cephalopathy, commonly known as Rasmussen's Syndrome."
It is evident that, prior to the airing of the television special,
Alex's parents had no indication that the DPT shot had any sort
of relation to their son's condition. At all times prior to this con-
nection, neither the medical community, nor those treating Alex
had any basis to connect Alex's chronic, permanent condition
with the DPT inoculations. Unfortunately, Alex's parents were
unable to allege such a connection within thirty-six months of
the last inoculation, because, prior to the television report, the
medical community limited DPT related injuries to acute enceph-
alopathies.
In Alex's case, during the time frame of the application of
the statute of limitations, there was insufficient medical evidence
to support a causal connection for recovery and Alex's parents
were unaware of the potential benefits of the Act. Subsequently,
Alex's parents became aware of their rights under the Vaccine
Act and would have been entitled to compensation if the causal
connection was made and a petition filed within the thirty-six
months following the date of his final DPT inoculation. However,
Alex was denied compensation and barred from recovery due to
his failure to comply with the statute of limitations provided in
the Vaccine Act. The harsh result in Alex's case is only one ex-
ample of the sort of injustices that can arise when courts strictly
apply the statute of limitations provision of the Vaccine Act to
undetected and unconnected medical conditions.
C. Recovery Under the National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986
The first step in obtaining coverage under the Vaccine Act is
the filing of a petition for compensation. This next section ex-
plains the general and case-specific procedures required by the
Vaccine Act.
57. For a discussion of medical views on the causal connection between DPT
inoculations of encephalopathy, see infra Part IIIA.
58. See id.
282 [Vol. 59
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1. General Procedure
In order to receive compensation for a vaccine-related injury,
Petitions for compensation must be filed with the Court of Feder-
al Claims within thirty-six months of the last inoculation.59
These claims are heard and decided by a special master appoint-
ed by judges of the United States Claims Court." After the re-
ceipt and filing of a petition the chief special master will assign
and designate a special master to review documents, listen to
testimony and set forth a decision that includes "finding of fact
and conclusions of law." Subsequently, the decision of the special
master may be reviewed by the United States Claims Court upon
a motion by the parties within thirty days of the issuance of the
specials master's decision."1
2. Procedure and Ruling in Alex's Case
On March 20, 1995, a Petition on behalf of Alex was filed
with the Court of Federal Claims. 2 The petition alleged that
Alex's final DPT vaccinations contained partial cell pertussis
baceteris and as a result of this Alex contracted DPT-induced
seizure disorders.' The disorders, as previously explained in
Part II(B), included high fever, encephalitis, and shock collapse.
Therefore, compensation should have been available to Alex,
because he first showed symptoms and the manifestation of
onset of significant aggravation of illnesses after the vaccine
inoculation, within the meaning of the vaccine injury table." "A
table injury is an injury, disability, illness or condition listed on
the Vaccine Injury Table."' Alex's parents alleged that his ex-
posure to the DPT vaccinations resulted in continued seizures
affecting his motor skills, bodily functions, and everyday activi-
ties." Alex and his family have suffered tremendous pain, suf-
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(aXl). The U.S. Claims Court was renamed the
court of Federal Claims on October 29, 1992. See Federal Courts Administration Act
of 1992, Pub L. No 102-572 §902(a), 106 Stat. 4506. 4506, 4516; Tandy, supra note
11.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1).
61. See 42 U.S.C § 300aa-12(d)(3)(a), 12 (eX1).
62. See Pertnoy v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs, No. 95-218V, 1995
WL 579827, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 18, 1995).
63. See id.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a).
65. Childs v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 33 Fed. Cl. 556, 558 n.1
(1995).
66. See Pertnoy, 1995 WL 579827, at *1-*2.
283
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fering, and emotional distress.67 Furthermore, the effects of the
final DPT vaccination have required Alex to undergo several
brain surgeries, including a hemispherectomy, during which
large portions of his brain were resectioned and removed."
Alex's parents contend that their son's life has been forever al-
tered due to the DPT inoculation on August 28, 1989.
In response to the Chariffs suit, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services,69 filed a motion to dismiss.7" The special mas-
ter who presided over the case, granted the motion to dismiss
with "prejudice for lack of jurisdiction."7' The special master
ruled that Alex's mother failed to inquire into her legal rights
until after the statute of limitations expired, therefore waiving
her right to now bring suit, and that she had ample opportuni-
ties in 1989 to question attorneys as to the feasibility of filing a
claim for compensation pursuant to the Vaccine Act.72 The spe-
cial master, reasoning that under an objective standard a reason-
able parent would have inquired into her legal rights, ultimately
stated that a reasonable parent would have sought legal options
after seeing such drastic changes in her son's condition.73 In
order to pursue federal monies under the Vaccine Act,74 a claim
must be filed in the federal claims court within thirty-six
months75 of the last vaccination.76 This statue of limitations is
set in stone and has no equitable consideration, regardless of
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Tandy, supra note 11, at 31 (stating that "the U. S. Government, spe-
cifically the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services" is the re-
spondent in vaccine compensation cases).
70. See Motion on file with author.
71. Special Master Order, No. 95-248V, at 10 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 18, 1995).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See 42 U.S.C § 300aa-16(aX2). "In the case of a vaccine set forth in the
Vaccine Injury Table which is administered after the effective date of this subpart, if
a vaccine-related injury occurred as a result of the administration of such vaccine, no
petition may be filed for compensation under the Program for such injury after the
expiration of 36 months after the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or
manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation of such injury." Id.
75. In Alex's case, a telephone status conference was conducted before Special
Master Laura D. Millman, in Court of Federal Claims, in which she heard argument
on behalf of both parties. At that time, the special master stated that, based upon
the submitted petition and supporting documentation, Alex Chariff would have been
eligible for benefits had he filled his petition within thirty-six months of the first
symptom or manifestation of injury after receiving the DPT vaccination. But because
the statute of limitations barred Alex from bring suit, he was unable to receive re-
lief.
76. See 42 U.S.C § 300aa-16(aX1).
10
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what medical complications or uncertainties of causation were
present at the time." The special master dismissed the action
stating that the application of equitable tolling in such a case
might result in an indefinite statute of limitations.7"
Alex's parents asserted in their petition for compensation
that, up until 1994, there was no recognized medical data sup-
porting the connection between Alex's encephalopathy and the
last DPT inoculation. v9 The Institute of Medicine (IOM)8 ° and
the medical community received first noticed that compensation
for chronic permanent nervous system dysfunction would be
permitted under the Vaccine Act."1 The IOM report is important
because it states that the Act provides for independent and im-
partial examination of health related subjects that are complex,
lacking in definitive date, or subject to differing opinions of repu-
table science. 2 It is clear that, in Alex's case, neither his doc-
tors, his parents, nor the medical community as a whole, realized
that there could be a causal connection until the IOM report was
issued. Consequently, the Vaccine Act's statute of limitations
should not have started to toll until March 2, 1994, the date
when Alex's parents made the connection between the vaccine
and Alex's condition.
There have been situations where inequities have resulted
due to strict compliance with the statute of limitations and a
reluctance to allow equitable tolling. Such an example occurred
77. See Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 116 (1992);
Alex's claim was filed on March 20, 1995, sixty-seven months after the last shot.
78. See Special Master Order, No. 95-248V, at 10 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 18, 1995).
79. The original petition is on file with the author.
80. The Institute of Medicine, was "chartered in 1970 by the National Academy
of Sciences to enlist distinguished members of the appropriate professions in the
examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public," and act as an
adviser to the federal government. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE TO STUDY
NEW RESEARCH ON VACCINES, DPT VACCINE AND CHRONIC NERVOUS SYSTEM DYS-
FUNCTION: A NEW ANALYSIS ii (Kathleen R. Stratton et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter
IOM].
81. See id. at 3.
82. See id. "The study was mandated by Section 312 of Public Law 99-660, the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, which called for specific reviews of
the adverse consequences possibly associated with Pertussis and Rubella vaccinations.
The Act specifically requested that the Institute of Medicine carry out these reviews,
since the IOM is well prepared to examine health related subjects that are of inter-
est to the executive and legislative branches, that have implications for a large seg-
ment of the population, and that are difficult to resolve because of their complexity
or lack of definitive date or where reputable science may have differing opinions, and
the judgment of an independent, impartial, a multi disciplinary body would be help-
ful." Id.
285
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in Melendez v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,' where
the United States Court of Federal Claims held that the discov-
ery rule would not be applied to the statute of limitations in the
Vaccine Program and that the Petitioner, once aware of the
child's injury, had a duty to inquire as to whether there were
legal remedies available.8 This strict interpretation of the law
puts an incredible burden upon parents. If all parents of sick
children followed this decision, they would want to call their
attorneys each time their child shows some abnormal behavior.
Only absurd results could come of such a duty.
In Alex's case, the court ruled that "a lack of knowledge of
one's rights is not enough to toll the statute of limitations. " '
Alex's parents do not refute this point as this is not the case in
Alex's situation. His parents made a good faith effort and exer-
cised due diligence in attempting to discover the causes of Alex's
injuries. Why would Alex's parents thought to pursue legal reme-
dies if they did not even have evidence to prove a causal rela-
tionship between his injuries and the vaccination?
Additionally, Alex's case is different from those claimants
who allege having no knowledge of the requirements of the Vac-
cine Act, prior to the expiration of its statutorily provided limita-
tions period. Prior to 1994, Alex had no medical data to support
his claim for compensation, but after the limitations period for
Alex's potential claim under the Vaccine Act expired, the medical
community altered its position regarding the DPT vaccine.'
The medical community, including Alex's doctors, indicated that
there is a causal connection between DPT and Alex's type of
encephalopathy.87 Indeed, if Alex had sought relief from the
Court prior to 1994, with the original medical data, his petition
would have been summarily dismissed. Up until 1994, neither
Alex's parents, nor his doctors, had any proof or medical data to
support a contention that his encephalopathy was caused by, and
the result of, his DPT vaccine. Since there was no evidence to
support such a claim, Alex's parents did not seek relief under the
Vaccine Act within the statutory limitations period.
83. No. 94-103V (Fed. Cl. Jan. 6, 1995).
84. Id.
85. Dion v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 166, 167 (1956).
86. See medical records on file with author.
87. See id.
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III. ESTABLISHING THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN INOCULATIONS
AND ENCEPHALOPATHY
The causation element is the key factor in obtaining recov-
ery under the Vaccine Act. The next section discusses what is
required, under the Vaccine Act, to establish causation and the
adverse affects that may occur once causation is established.
A. Discovery of the Causal Link
Alex's condition was not diagnosed by physicians as there
was no knowledge of a causal connection between the DPT shot
and the new condition, until the doctors reversed their position
in an IOM publication," in mid-1994.89 As of 1991, the IOM
was aware of a British study which was investigating the long-
term effects of DPT vaccines."° However, prior to 1991, the
studies were inconclusive as to any causal link between DPT and
chronic seizure syndrome."' In 1994, the IOM decided to rein-
vestigate the findings of the British study and concluded that
there was evidence to support a causal connection between the
administration of the DPT vaccine and resulting chronic seizure
disorders. 2 As indicated earlier in this article, the study subse-
quently conducted by the IOM affirmed that the new evidence
showed a causal relationship between vaccine with DPT and
Acute Encephalopathy.9 The committee found that the excess
risk is estimated to range from 0.0 to 10.5 per million DPT im-
munizations. However, the same IOM Committee also found, in
1991, that the evidence was insufficient to support a causal rela-
tionship between DPT and permanent neuralgic damage. Be-
cause the evidence showing a causal relationship between the
DPT and acute encephalopathy has been so limited, and because
of the ten-year follow up to the National Childhood Encepha-
lopathy Study, the United States Public Health Service asked
the IOM to study the new data and, "if warranted, reevaluating
the causal relationship between DPT and Chronic Nervous Sys-
tem Dysfunction.'
The National Vaccine Program" was established on No-
88. See IOM, supra note 80, at 2-3.
89. See 60 Minutes (CBS television program on Mar. 2, 1994).
90. See IOM, supra note 80, at 4.
91. Generically termed "epilepsy".
92. See 1OM, supra note 80, at 3.
93. See id. at 14.
94. See id. at 1.
95. This act was established to "achieve optimal prevention of human infectious
1998] 287
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vember 14, 1986.96 The government apparently was aware of
the adverse effects that some vaccinations might have upon chil-
dren,97 as evidenced by the implementation of the Vaccine
Act.98 It was not until 1994 that the IOM gave the first notice
to the general medical community and potential claimants (such
as Alex) that such a condition" might be related to the DPT
and therefore compensable. Up until this point, Alex's parents
were not aware of any connection between the child's symptoms
and the inoculation." Additionally, none of the doctors who
examined Alex was able to make a causal connection between
the DPT shots and his condition. 10' It would have been futile
for Alex to petition for benefits previously, since his condition
was not described as having a relationship to DPT vaccinations.
As of 1991, the IOM committee concluded that the evidence
was inadequate to establish a causal relationship between DPT
and permanent neurologic damage. 2 In contrast, the 1994
IOM report stated, "the relation between DPT and chronic ner-
vous system dysfunction had not been studied in a rigorous sci-
entific manner until recently;"" currently "the balance of evi-
dence is consistent with a causal relation between DPT and the
forms of chronic nervous system dysfunction."' ° Therefore it
was not until the 1994 report that the general medical communi-
ty or Alex's parents would have been aware of the updated re-
sults. The original committee had concluded there was not
enough evidence to indicate a relationship between the DPT and
febrile seizures, febrile seizures or epilepsy."5 In December of
1993, in light of the new data from the National Childhood En-
cephalopathy Study (NCES), the IOM was enlisted to study the
relationship between DPT inoculations and permanent nervous
system damage which resulted in the finding of a causal rela-
tionship was between the DPT inoculations and permanent ner-
diseases through immunization and to achieve optimal prevention against adverse
reactions to vaccines." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 (1994).
96. See Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3756 (1986).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 (1994).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a) allows for compensation under the National Vaccine
Act for vaccine-related injuries.
99. This refers to a chronic, permanent nervous system dysfunction.
100. Medical records are on file with author.
101. See id.
102. See IOM, supra note 80, at 3.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id. at 2.
105. See id. at 3.
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vous system dysfunction."3°
The NCES was a "case-control study" of serious acute neuro-
logic illnesses in children living in Great Britain."7 In 1993,
the NCES published its results from a ten-year follow-up study.
In this report the NCES determined that some areas of dysfunc-
tion can be detected by parents and even teachers upon examina-
tion of the child."8 The NCES concluded that these areas were
"quite broad" and could include children's neurologic reactions,
motor skill, sensory perception, behavior, such as howling, and
self-care dysfumctions.1°9 The new data from the follow-up
study indicated that children who experience "a serious acute
neurologic illness are at risk for chronic nervous system dys-
function," similar to the condition afflicting Alex."' The NCES
data indicates that there is a strong possibility that some chil-
dren, without underlying brain or metabolic abnormalities, could
come to suffer and experience serious acute neurologic illness
within seven days after receiving DPT."' "Acute illness could
have chronic nervous system sequelae.""2 The NCES data also
supports the notion that some children with underlying brain or
metabolic abnormalities "might go on to develop Chronic Ner-
vous System Dysfunction due to a DPT-triggered acute ill-
ness.""3 Therefore the Committee's findings are conclusive evi-
dence that there is a causal relation between DPT and Chronic
Nervous System Dysfunction in those children who experience a
serious acute neurologic illness within seven days after receiving
DPT vaccine."4 Children such as Alex, who receive DPT and
later come to suffer serious acute neurologic illness, might be
expected to either experience chronic, permanent nervous system
dysfunction or die.1"
106. See id. at 2.
107. See id. at 6.
108. See id. at 9.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 16.
111. See id. at 15.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 13.
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B. Applications of the Causal Link
1. General Causation Scenarios
By utilizing the IOM's findings, a petitioner in Alex's posi-
tion--where the acute neurologic illnesses that follow the DPT
may be related to Chronic Nervous System Dysfunction--can now
make a claim under three scenarios. The findings of this new
study open the door for compensation for litigants like Alex.
Before these three scenarios can be discussed, it is important to
note that the NCES data does not permit any distinctions to be
drawn between the three scenarios."' Hence, any conclusions
based upon any one of these scenarios might be the "true" expla-
nation.'17 The IOM Committee's conclusions indicate that they
do not support any of these scenarios over the others. The first
scenario stated by the NCES involves situations where "DPT ad-
ministration might cause a serious acute neurologic illness and
subsequent chronic nervous system dysfunction in children who
otherwise might not have experienced either an acute neurologic
illness or chronic dysfunction in the absence of DPT.""' 8 If this
were the sole explanation of whether DPT and Chronic Nervous
System Dysfunction were causally related, the committee would
have concluded that the relation is causal and that DPT increas-
es the risk of Chronic Nervous System Dysfunction in chil-
dren."
9
However, the second scenario indicated that "DPT might
trigger (and thereby be an immediate or proximate cause [of] . .
-) an acute neurologic illness and subsequent chronic nervous
system dysfunction in children with underlying brain or metabol-
ic abnormalities."20 These abnormalities might make the chil-
dren react adversely to stimuli such as fever, infection, and vac-
cines that children without such abnormalities might toler-
ate.12' "Thus, these children might have experienced chronic
nervous system dysfunction even in the absence of DPT adminis-
tration.... ."' It is possible that some other, non-DPT-related,
acute event might have triggered the illness."
Lastly, DPT inoculations might cause an illness in children
116. See id. at 14.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 14.
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with underlying brain abnormalities that would have eventually
have led to chronic nervous system dysfunction even in the ab-
sence of an acute neurologic illness. The essence of this third
connection is that the presence of underlying brain abnormalities
might predispose a child to react adversely to the DPT with an
acute neurologic illness."l In this situation it is the "underly-
ing abnormality that is the cause of the chronic nervous system
dysfunction, not the acute illness. " "
The NCES data suggests that the first scenario is consistent
with a "causal" relationship between DPT and Chronic nervous
System Dysfunction, while the third scenario is not. The NCES
is not clear on whether the second scenario is consistent with a
causal connection between DPT and Chronic Nervous System
Dysfunction. 26 The IOM concluded, based on its studies and
the NCES follow up report, that if a child had not experienced
an acute neurologic illness other than one which occurred within
seven days after receiving the final DPT inoculation and then
the child experiences Chronic Nervous System Dysfunction, the
evidence is consistent with a causal relation between DPT and
the Chronic Nervous System Dysfunction.'27 In response to the
above findings, the IOM changed its position and now accepts a
"causal" relationship between DPT and chronic nervous system
dysfunction.' The IOM now also recognizes that children who
previously received DPT inoculations but did not have underly-
ing brain or metabolic abnormalities, might, after receiving DPT,
suffer serious acute neurologic illness and "could have chronic
nervous system sequelae."
2. Legal Implications of the Causation Scenarios
In rendering the ruling in Alex's case, Special Master
Millman pointed out that she was not bound by the 1M. 3° In-
deed, the National Vaccine Act does not require special masters
to accept IOM reports as dispositive on the issue of claim
brought under the vaccine act. To the contrary, the Act affords
the special master considerable discretion to weigh evidence oth-
124. See id.
125. Id. (emphasis in original).
126. See id. at 15.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See Special Master Order, No. 95-248V, (Fed. Cl. Sept. 18, 1995).
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er than the IOM reports.13' Estep v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services,'32 a United States Court of Federal Claims
opinion, decided June 25, 1993, clarifies that the special master
may place varying weights on the IOM report and the NCES,
even finding differently in different cases on the same issue."
"The court is aware that in previous decisions, special masters
have reached varying conclusions as to the probative value of the
IOM report and the NCES." In Estep, the special master
found the IOM report unpersuasive. However, in Cucuras v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services,35 the same special
master was presented with conflicting evidence." One party
offered into evidence the IOM report while the other offered the
NCES report with the testimony a doctor.1 37 In Cucuras, the
special master came to the opposite conclusion from that in
Estep.' He concluded that the IOM report was more persua-
sive, than the doctor's testimony. 39
It is the author's view that the IOM report is persuasive and
should be given more credence than Special Master Millman
allowed for in Alex's case. The Petitioners in Alex's case request-
ed that the court place heavy weight upon the 1994 IOM report
and recognize that the information available to the medical com-
munity was recently updated to include its findings. 4° The
IOM has been empowered with the ability to revise and update
the eligibility for benefits under the National Vaccine Acts and
has done so.'" Indeed, this alone is enough to illustrate the
power the IOM. Therefore, the deference the judges should give
131. See Pertnoy v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 95-218V, 1995
WL 579827 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 18, 1995).
132. 28 Fed Cl. 664 (1993).
133. See id.
134. Sharpnack v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 457, 459
(1993); Cucuras v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 537, 543 (1992)
affd, 993 F.2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Sumrall v. Secretary of Health and
Human Servs., 23 Cl. Ct. 1, 6 (1991).
135. 26 Cl. Ct. 537 (1992), affd, 993 F.2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
136. See Cucuras, 26 Cl. Ct. at 543.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 543, 545-46.
140. Complaint on file with author.
141. See Rules and Regulations Department of Health and Human Services Pub-
lic Health Service, 60 Fed. Reg. 7679 ("After weighing all the varied opinions ex-
pressed at the June meeting, as well as the written comments received from two
commissions members, the Department has decided that a final rule which is a re-
vised and refined version of the proposed rule published in 1992 will reflect best as
scientific evidence.").
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to the IOM reports is great, especially if Congress has deemed
the IOM competent to recommend and update the medical
community. 42
One of the objectives of the Vaccine Act" is to ensure that
the vaccine injury table is updated periodically to ensure scien-
tific knowledge is reflected.'" The Department of Health and
Human Services has carefully reviewed'the IOM's conclusions re-
garding DPT vaccine and Chronic Nervous System Dys-
function.145 The Department concluded that despite the uncer-
tainty regarding causation, the final rule is consistent with IOM
report and conclusions regarding the Miller Study.'" This new
rule allows for "a presumption of causation if the DPT vaccine
recipient shows signs of injury, within the applicable period, the
injury meets the description of an acute encephalopathy, and the
chronic encephalopathy persists for more than six months be-
yond the date of vaccination."'47 Hence, the final rule is con-
sistent with the IOM's conclusions that some children, like Alex,
have been shown to have experienced an acute encephalopathy
following vaccine administration and then have gone on to devel-
op chronic neurologic dysfunction.'"
In the instant case, Alex demonstrated appropriate manifes-
tations of a DPT related injury within the specified time provid-
ed in the injury table set forth in the Vaccine Act. However,
since Alex's injury is a chronic, permanent neurological dysfunc-
tion, based upon the strict wording of the 1991 IOM Report, Alex
would have not been eligible to receive benefits because the DPT
was causally related by the IOM only to acute encephalopathies.
It was not until 1994 that the IOM made public its findings,
which expanded the causal relationship definition to the chronic
permanent conditions experienced by Alex.
The special master who ruled on Alex's case claimed that
children suffering from chronic encephalopathy were routinely
granted benefits; however, a review of the literature reveals
cases in which the "acute" criteria was strictly enforced.149 For
142. See id.
143. This program was released by the National Vaccine Program Office/OASH.
144. See Rules and Regulations -Department of Health and Human Services Pub-
lic Health Service, 60 Fed. Reg. 7685.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See 1994 Institute of Medicine Report Executive Summary 1-3 (1994).
149. See Yeoman v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 90-1049V, 1994
WL 387855 (Fed. Cl. July 11, 1994).
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example, the court in Yeoman v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services,"5 the court stated,
Summarizing, Dr. Kinsbourne's testimony appears to be that
the parent's [sic.] are credible and that Hillary suffered from
the vaccine-related residual seizure disorder after the first shot.
Dr. Joel Herskowitz, a board-certified pediatric neurologist
testified that Hillary presently suffers from a seizure disorder
and a chronic encephalopathy. Her conditions, however, were
not caused by the DPT vaccinations and do not fall within the
Vaccine Injury Table.1"'
Similarly, in Alex's case medical science did not draw a causal
link between his DPT shot and his chronic encephalopathy until
1994. Accordingly, Alex should not be barred from recovery for
having failed to make a claim at a time when, based on the
available medical information, his claim would have been denied.
IV. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL VERSUS STATUTES OF LIMITATION
Special Master Millman in her decision stated that, "[tihe
purpose of a statute of limitations is the promotion of justice by
preventing presentation of claims which have been dormant and
are later revived when 'evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'"152 According to the
United States Supreme Court, "The theory is that even if one
has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them."153 Special Master Millman continued by say-
ing that "ignorance of one's legal rights does not toll the statue of
limitations".M Specifically, Millman pointed to the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act and found that "She [Alex's moth-
er] was under a duty to seek legal counsel before she saw a tele-
vision program in 1994.""'1 To support her conclusion, Millman
pointed to three cases.
150. No. 90-1049V, 1994 WL 387855, at *4-*5 (Fed. Cl. July, 11, 1994).
151. Id.
152. Pertnoy v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 95-218V, 1995 WL
579827, at *2 (citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-349 (1944)).
153. Order of R.R. Tel., 321 U.S. at 348-349.
154. Pertnoy, 1995 WL 579827 at *3.
155. Id. at *3.
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Millman first relied on Cragin v. United States,'58 where
the court dismissed the Cragins' complaint due to their failure to
comply with the two-year statue of limitations.'57 The plain-
tiffs, the Cragins, had a duty to ask about their legal recourse
before the statute of limitations expired." The duty to inquire
is based on an objective, not a subjective, standard.' Even if a
doctor would not have disclosed the cause of the victim's injuries,
the duty to inquire is not the same as the duty to disclose."
The court held that plaintiffs did not exercise reasonable dili-
gence in inquiring into the cause of the victim's injuries.'6'
It is important to understand the distinction between Cragin
and Chariff. In Alex's case his parents did not have the knowl-
edge that the Cragin family had. The special master in Alex's
case seems to have missed this distinction or, at a minimum, felt
that there was adequate evidence for the Chariff family to have
proceeded: 'Yet petitioner asserts that the symptoms she alleges
Alex suffered were not compensable before the IOM report in
1994 and moreover, are symptoms of a chronic condition.
Petitioner's assertion is not credible."6 2
As to equitable tolling in Alex's case, the court found that
"there was no justification for applying equitable tolling.""
The Order further stated:
Petitioner had ample opportunity in 1989 to query attorneys as
to the feasibility of presenting claim. If the facts were as she
alleges them, i.e., within three days of his fourth DPT, Alexan-
der had encephalitis, shock, high fever, loss of muscle tone,
paralysis, and unresponsiveness to external stimuli, a reason-
able parent, if viewed using the objective standard, would have
inquired into her legal rights .... A passive petitioner has no
equitable right to toll the statute of limitations indefinitely
until a fortuitous media even prompts her to take action.'
6
Once again, the court rejected the Alex's contention that the
statute of limitations should not apply in this case because of
equitable tolling, in that Alex's injury was unknowable until
156. 684 F. Supp 746 (D. Me. 1988), aft'd, 873 F.2d 1433 (1st Cir. 1989).
157. See id. at 750.
158. See id. at 752-53.
159. See id. at 754.
160. See id. at 755.
161. See id. at 753 (quoting Pertnoy, 1995 WL 579827, at *6).
162. Pertnoy, 1995 WL 579827 at *3.
163. Id. at *4.
164. Id.
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after the statute of limitations had expired."
V. APPLYING THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT TO ALEX'S
CASE
The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a plaintiff who, de-
spite having exercised all due diligence, is unable to obtain vital
information bearing on the existence of the claim, to avoid a
statute of limitations." This doctrine will be applied when "an
accrual date has been ascertained but plaintiff does not know of
his claim.""6 7 The standard for equitable tolling has often been
repeated within the Federal Circuit, which has stated that equi-
table tolling can apply when the plaintiff shows that their injury
"was 'inherently unknowable' at the accrual date,"" such as in
Alex's case.
In cases brought before the United States Supreme Court,
the Court instructed that the principles of equitable tolling fully
apply to cases brought against federal governments.' In Irwin
v. Department of Veterans Affairsy ° the Supreme Court held
that the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling appli-
cable to suits against private defendants should be applied to
suits against the United States. Additionally, Judge Plager of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted the
importance of the Irwin decision.' and stated that federal
courts no longer attempt to discern, on a case-by-case basis,
which statutory time limits may be waived and which are
deemed to be "jurisdictional."'72 Judge Plager added that Con-
165. See id.
166. The doctrine of equitable tolling relates to the situation when a cause of
action has accrued, but the plaintiff cannot obtain information necessary to decide
whether the injury is due to wrongdoing and is so, due to wrongdoing by the defen-
dant. See Stevens v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 25 Cl. 12, 23 (1994).
167. Catawba Indian Tribe v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (citing Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass'n v. United States, 373 F.2d 356,
358-59 (Ct. Cl. 1967)); see also Massard v. Secretary of Health and Rehabilitative
Servs., 25 Cl. Ct. 421, 425 (1992).
168. Welcker v. United States, 752 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Japa-
nese War Notes Claimants Ass'n, 373 F.2d at 358-59). Accord Catawaba Indian Tribe
v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993); D'Andrea v. United States, 27 Fed.
Cl. 612, 615 (1993).
169. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1990).
170. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
171. See Wood-Ivey Sys. v. United States, 4 F.3d 961, 964 n. 4 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
172. "It is no longer necessary for courts to offer unconvincing explanations as to
why some statutory time limits are waivable and some not. It is now presumed that
Congress intends traditional waiver to be available, unless Congress expressly spec-
ifies otherwise." Id. at 969 n.3.
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gress may, if it chooses, "make a specified time limit jurisdiction-
al and unwaivable, but it must do so unmistakably."'7 3
Clearly, Alex and others like him are barred from recovery if
the statute of limitations is strictly enforced. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit acknowledged that equi-
table tolling may well be available under the National Child
Vaccine Act. " 4 In the Gilbert case, which involved a petitioner's
untimely election to accept a final judgment, the Federal Circuit
Court held that the requirements for equitable tolling were not
satisfied under the facts of the case and noted that whether the
doctrine applies is an open question.' 5
In another case involving the time limit of filing a petition
by parties who had an action pending in state court when an Act
went into effect, the Federal Circuit Court again noted, but did
not decide the equitable tolling issue."7 6 The court went on to
explain that they "need not decide if equitable tolling would be
available in such a situation, even if, as the Claims Court has
held, equitable tolling generally is not available under the Vac-
cine Act because the limitations period contained in the Act is a
statute of repose.' 7
Although there is some authority indicating that equitable
tolling may not be available under the Vaccine Act, in Alex's case
this authority should not be followed. First, the Federal Circuit
has refused to endorse the position of these trial courts, which
indicate that equitable tolling should not be allowed, even when
presented with the opportunity to do so. This suggests that the
appellate court has some doubts on the question of whether to
apply equitable tolling to cases such as Alex's. Furthermore, the
Claims Court cases on equitable tolling involve the deadline for
pre-Act vaccinations. These courts note that the legislative histo-
ry for those claims mandates that there be no equitable tolling
under that provision.'
173. Id.
174. See Gilbert v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 51 F.3d 254, 255
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
175. "Gilbert invokes the doctrine of equitable tolling to avoid the time bar of
21(a). Assuming without deciding that the doctrine sometimes may be used to do
that . . . ." Id. at 257.
176. See Weddel v. Secretary of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 23 F.3d 388,
393 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
177. Id. (citations omitted); see also Widdoss v. Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., 989 F.2d 1170, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Newman, J., dissenting) (notice to re-
view special master's decision which is filed one day late is subject to equitable toll-
ing).
178. See Stevens v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 31 Fed. Cl. 12
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However, during Alex's case, the government presented no
evidence as to post-Act vaccinations which would have rebutted
the Irwin presumption that equitable tolling is available. 7
Furthermore, the aforementioned trial level cases tend to speak
of the filing requirements as being "jurisdictional." For example,
in Stevens v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,8 ' the
court stated that "the filing deadlines included in the Vaccine
Act are jurisdictional and cannot be waived for any petitioner by
this court, even in a compelling case."'' All of the different
opinions taken together, including the Supreme Court opinion in
Irwin, the suggestions by the Federal Circuit Court, and the lack
of legislative intent involving post-Act vaccinations and time bar
restraints, indicate the doctrine of equitable tolling' should be
available to people in Alex's situation."3
(1994); Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 116 (1992);
Massard v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 25 Cl. Ct. 421, 425-26 (1992)
("The special master in his analysis of Section 16(a)(1) concluded that the 4-month
extension authorized in the 1990 amendments clearly was intended to serve as a
cutoff for the filing of retrospective cases.")
179. Another Claims Court case finding no equitable tolling under the Act in-
volved yet a different provision not at issue here: the provision (42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
16) that a petition for compensation must be filed within twenty-four months after
the death of a person receiving a vaccination. See Anderson v. Secretary Health and
Human Servs., No. 92288V, 1993 U.S. Claims LEXIS 207 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 19, 1993);
Fuentes v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 92-162V, 1993 U.S. Claims
LEXIS 204 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 11, 1993).
180. 31 Fed. Cl. 12, 24 (1994).
181. Nevertheless, as explained in Judge Plager's concurrence in Wood-Ivey Sys.
Corp., 4 F.3d 961, 969 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993): "Since Irwin, compliance with statutory
time limits is no longer jurisdictional, in the old sense that when a Congressionally
specified time limit had expired a court had no power to entertain the case. The
presumption is now to the contrary. The court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit
and to determine on the merits if equitable relief from the time bar is warranted."
182. Equitable tolling can also apply where the defendants concealed its acts
with the result that the plaintiff was unaware of their existence. This was not ap-
parent in Alex's case but rather, based on medical science, no one knew that Alex's
condition was within the parameters of the Vaccination Act. In Anderson v. Secretary
of Health and Human Servs., No. 92388V, 1993 U.S. Claims LEXIS 207 (Fed. Cl.
Feb. 19, 1993) and Fuentes v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 92-162V,
1993 U.S. Claims LEXIS 204 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 11, 1993), Special Master Hastings de-
scribed equitable tolling as being dependent upon concealment by the defendant. As
stated, this is not correct. The Federal circuit cases cited in this text explain that
"Plaintiff must either show that defendant has concealed its acts with the result that
plaintiff was unaware of their existence, or its must show that is injury was 'inher-
ently unknowable' at the accrual date." Catawba Indian Tribe, 982 F.2d at 1571
(quoting Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass'n v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 359
(Ct. Cl. 1967)) (emphasis added); See Welcker v. United States, 752 F.2d 1577, 1580
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
183. See Hearing on S. 2117 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 98th Cong. 98-1060 (1985); Hearing on S. 827 Before the Senate Comm. on
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VI. CONCLUSION
The National Vaccine Act' has resulted in confusion and
inappropriate results. The fact that the medical community was
not aware of a connection between Alex's symptoms and his DPT
inoculation should not bar him from subsequent recovery. The
bottom line is that nobody knew.
Currently, the statute of limitations starts to run at the time
the DPT injection is given. For cases such as Alex's the statute
should start to run from the discovery of a connection between a
disease and its cause. Under the current time bar if you do not
make the connection it is good-bye and good luck. This is not
right and that is why the doctrine of equitable tolling should be
applied to all cases where a connection could not have been de-
tected.
Although compensation may still be obtained through going
after the drug companies for the defective lots of DPT, there
remains a need to afford assistance to parents and children who
have this disease. The government has done this by establishing
the National Vaccine Act. However, for full recovery to occur, the
Act must make allowances for children and their parents who
had no possible way of knowing or detecting a connection or
when the medical community, as a whole, did not accept a causal
connection position. If Alex's case proves anything, it is that
severe injustice can come from a strict interpretation of the Na-
tional Vaccine Act's statute of limitations and "he who hesitates
is lost."
Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 99-222 (1985); Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong. 98-350 (1983).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to -34 (1994).
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